Fishermen, economic incentives and cooperation: a study based on the public good game
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20397/2177-6652/2022.v22i2.2331Palabras clave:
Public good game, Fishermen, Economic incentivesResumen
Objetivo do estudo:
Investigate how fishermen cooperate to the preservation of the reservoir from which they derive their livelihood, considering the influence of economic incentives in the form of punishments and rewards.
Metodologia:
Economic field experiments were carried out with professional fishermen from the fishing colonies located throughout the municipalities bathed by the Itaipu reservoir. The public good game had two possibilities of treatment: punishment and reward.
Originalidade:
In the preliminary review, few studies simultaneously addressed the issue of reservoir preservation and the cooperation of professional fishermen, based on game theory and behavioral economics.
Principais resultados:
Among the main findings, there is the dependence of the group of fishermen in the reservoir and the nature of the work interfering in cooperation decisions, which means that the punishment and reward mechanisms have no effect on the fishermen.
Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas:
The findings of the current research raise reflections on the efficiency of economic incentives, based on game theory, and on how cooperation decisions are taken by fishermen.
Contribuições sociais / para a gestão:
This research contributes to the debate on the challenge of the states in adopting policies to preserve the public good and companies that develop joint projects with fishermen.
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