Fishermen, economic incentives and cooperation: a study based on the public good game

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20397/2177-6652/2022.v22i2.2331

Keywords:

Public good game, Fishermen, Economic incentives

Abstract

 

 

Objetivo do estudo: 

Investigate how fishermen cooperate to the preservation of the reservoir from which they derive their livelihood, considering the influence of economic incentives in the form of punishments and rewards.

Metodologia:

Economic field experiments were carried out with professional fishermen from the fishing colonies located throughout the municipalities bathed by the Itaipu reservoir. The public good game had two possibilities of treatment: punishment and reward.

Originalidade: 

In the preliminary review, few studies simultaneously addressed the issue of reservoir preservation and the cooperation of professional fishermen, based on game theory and behavioral economics.

Principais resultados: 

Among the main findings, there is the dependence of the group of fishermen in the reservoir and the nature of the work interfering in cooperation decisions, which means that the punishment and reward mechanisms have no effect on the fishermen.

Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas: 

The findings of the current research raise reflections on the efficiency of economic incentives, based on game theory, and on how cooperation decisions are taken by fishermen.

Contribuições sociais / para a gestão: 

This research contributes to the debate on the challenge of the states in adopting policies to preserve the public good and companies that develop joint projects with fishermen.

Author Biographies

Fabricio Baron Mussi, Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná

Aluno de estágio Pós Doutoral na Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná, no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Planejamento e Governança Pública

Anderson Catapan, Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná

Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Planejamento e Governança Pública

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Published

2022-06-30

How to Cite

Mussi, F. B., & Catapan, A. (2022). Fishermen, economic incentives and cooperation: a study based on the public good game. Journal of Management & Technology, 22(2), 76–98. https://doi.org/10.20397/2177-6652/2022.v22i2.2331

Issue

Vol. 22 No. 2 (2022): Abril/Junho

Section

ARTIGO

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